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I
n this issue of Emerging Infectious Diseases, Victoria 
Davey and Robert Glass present a paper (1) in which 
they consider the question of when to “switch off” com-
munity-based interventions designed to reduce the spread 
of pandemic inﬂ  uenza. These authors attempt to answers 
questions such as when it would be optimal to reopen 
schools that have been closed as part of a nonpharmaceuti-
cal, communitywide inﬂ  uenza mitigation strategy.
The authors use a mathematical model, previously 
described in this journal (2), to simulate the spread of 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza throughout a community that repre-
sents the US population. This model is similar to another 
model that was used to examine the effectiveness of clos-
ing schools to slow the spread of inﬂ  uenza pandemic (3). 
Both models simulate the spread of inﬂ  uenza by dividing 
a representative population into households. The models 
then track each household member with each member hav-
ing a deﬁ  ned number of random contacts (per day) that 
are allocated within a network of possible contacts. Once 
a contact is calculated to have occurred, the probability of 
inﬂ  uenza transmission is calculated. Also included in the 
calculations are variables such as inﬂ  uenza incubation and 
infectiousness periods.
What does the model “say”? Davey and Glass con-
sidered what would happen if schools were reopened and 
community-wide sequestering were halted when inﬂ  uenza 
cases in a community fall below preset thresholds (e.g., 1, 
2, or 3 cases in 7 days). Sequestering strategies would be 
restarted if the epidemic pandemic resurged and >10 cases 
occurred in a 7-day period. This “pulsing technique” would 
reduce the number of days needed to sequester schoolchil-
dren and the community by 6% to 32%. The authors main-
tain that for a given pandemic scenario, the reduction in 
days sequestered would not notably affect the number of 
persons infected. The implication is that reduction in days 
sequestered will reduce the economic impact and social 
disruption caused by community-wide, nonpharmaceutical 
interventions.
Are the results “believable”? As with all mathemati-
cal models, some potential technical problems exist. First, 
almost all models that simulate individual person-to-per-
son inﬂ  uenza transmission use 1 or 2 databases that record 
the probability of inﬂ   uenza transmission. One database 
was recorded in the early 1970s in Tecumseh, Michigan 
(4), and the other among ≈400 households across France 
(5). Is it reasonable to use these estimates to simulate in-
ﬂ  uenza transmission in every community, town, city, and 
metropolis in the United States? Furthermore, the research-
ers who calculated these transmission probabilities did not 
actually measure the probabilities of who infected whom. 
These probabilities were calculated by using a statistical 
technique known as maximum likelihood estimation. Es-
sentially, this is reverse engineering to ﬁ  nd the transmis-
sion probabilities that best ﬁ  t the measured data (number of 
cases over time). However, as others have demonstrated, it 
is possible to reverse-engineer several transmission prob-
abilities that ﬁ  t the data (6). Would the results calculated 
by Davey and Glass appreciably change if another set of 
transmission probabilities was used?
Other assumptions may also be examined. Typically, 
as with other pandemic models, the authors model differ-
ent rates of compliance, but each rate is assumed to remain 
static for the duration of sequestering (e.g., 50% compliance 
during 40 days of sequestering). In reality, compliance with 
sequestering may be more fragmented; e.g., teenagers may 
stay sequestered during the morning but not so much in the 
afternoon. Other behavior may change during a pandemic; 
e.g., people may alter the number and duration of contacts, 
with degree of alteration changing as the pandemic pro-
gresses. These changes in behavior could either reinforce 
or reduce the effectiveness of nonpharmaceutical interven-
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USAtions (7,8). Furthermore, compliance can decrease dramati-
cally when an intervention is stopped and then restarted. 
Crosby provides an excellent example of reduced compli-
ance after an attempt to reintroduce compulsory wearing of 
facemasks in San Francisco during the 1918 pandemic (9).
Are such models useful? Yes, so long as readers ac-
cept that the results are illustrative and are not absolutely 
accurate. The models clearly illustrate the complexities of 
estimating inﬂ  uenza transmission and the potential success 
of interventions (i.e., such models require a very large set 
of variables, many with uncertain values). Perhaps the most 
useful role of such models is the debate that is stimulated 
regarding the most appropriate, and most feasible (i.e., 
most likely to work), set of interventions.
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